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Michael Hünseler and Dirk Schubert
Abstract One of the lessons of the financial crisis as of late was the inherent credit
risk attached to the value of derivatives. Since not all derivatives can be cleared by
central counterparties, a significant amount of OTC derivatives will be subject to
increased regulatory capital charges. These charges cover both current and future
unexpected losses; the capital costs for derivatives transactions can become substan-
tial if not prohibitive. At the same time, capital optimization through CDS hedging of
counterparty risks will result in a hedge position beyond the economic risk (“over-
hedging”) required to meet Basel II/III rules. In addition, IFRS accounting rules
again differ from Basel, creating a mismatch when hedging CVA. Even worse, CVA
hedging using CDS may introduce significant profit and loss volatility while satis-
fying the conditions for capital relief. An innovative approach to hedging CVA aims
to solve these issues.
Keywords CVA · Hedging · CDS · Contingent financial guarantee · Risk charges ·
OTC derivatives
1 Preface
In the following the nexus between credit risk (counterparty risk), liquidity, and
market risk is analyzed and a solution with respect to CVA hedging of OTC derivative
contracts is proposed.
The starting point is the consideration of collateral and its respective recognition in
different but “basic” financial instruments like repos and (partially un-) collateralized
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OTC derivative contracts as well as the comparison to corresponding uncollateralized
financial instruments like money market loans or uncollateralized OTC derivative
contracts. The role of collateral is analyzed with respect to its legal basis, its treatment
in Financial Accounting (IFRS, refer to [4]) and regulatory reporting according to
Basel II/III (cf. [1, 2]).
The analysis leads to a definition of the concept of liquidity and its relation to
the use of collateral in financial markets. As will be shown, the concept of liquidity,
inherent in the legal framework related to collateral of basic financial instruments, can
be considered as a transformation of secured into unsecured financing and vice versa.
Moreover, with respect to the associated valuation and risk the liquidity transforma-
tion exhibits similarities to the concept of wrong-way risk. The transformation of
unsecured into secured financing can be used to derive new types of financial instru-
ments, e.g. in the application to CVA hedging issues of OTC derivative contracts. In
this case the hedging instrument also solves the issue of disentangling funding value
adjustments (FVA) and counterparty value adjustments (CVA), which is intensively
discussed by practitioners in context with the pricing of OTC derivatives.
2 The Role of Collateral in OTC Contracts and Its Legal
Basis
In the following the main legal basis with respect to the role of collateral is outlined.
2.1 The Role of Legal Versus Economic Ownership
There are two main properties which are of relevance in connection with the role of
collateral, the transfer of legal ownership (i.e. the possibility of “re-hypothecation”)
in contrast to the economic ownership and the value of the collateral.
By entering into a repurchase agreement the legal title to the securities is trans-
ferred to the counterparty but economically the securities stay with the selling coun-
terparty since the buying counterparty has the obligation to compensate the selling
counterparty for income (manufactured payments) associated with the securities and
to redeliver the securities. In case of an Event of Default, both obligations terminate.
The treatment in an Event of Default provides that the residual claim is settled in
cash and determined taking into account the cash side as well as the value of the
collateral. In this case the obligation to redeliver securities transferred as collateral
expires and the buying counterparty remains the legal owner. Thus the price risk of
the collateral (uncertainty of value) is entirely borne by the legal owner.
In case of (only) economic ownership, e.g. a pledge, this is not necessarily the
case, since the treatment in an Event of Default differs as e.g. this kind of “collateral”
is part of the bankrupt/legal estate and therefore underlying the insolvency procedure.
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Despite these legal differences, the regulatory rules according to Basel II/III and the
accounting rules under IFRS also require different treatment of collateral. In general
IFRS follows the economic ownership concept irrespective of the legal basis of the
collateral while Basel II/III rather follows the legal ownership concept.
2.2 Affected Market Participants
Not all market participants are affected by the same accounting and regulatory rules.
Banks have to follow IFRS and Basel II/III rules, while e.g. investment funds are not
affected by Basel II/III rules but are governed by investment fund legislation, e.g.
UCITS directive. These different legal frameworks for market participants impact
the usage of collateral in OTC contracts, e.g. the assets of an investment fund under
UCITS represent special assets and the use of repos and cash collateral is limited. In
addition, these investment funds have no access to sources of liquidity other than the
capital paid which limits the use of cash and the provision of cash collateral in context
of derivatives exposure. For example, cash collateral received from OTC derivative
contracts has to be kept in segregated accounts and cannot be used for any kind of
(reverse) repo transaction. Alternatively, the use of a custodian for optimizing the
provision of cash collateral can be considered.
2.3 Financial Instruments Involving Collateral and Standard
Legal Frameworks (Master Agreements)
Analyzing the legal basis of collateral facilitates the definition of liquidity and liq-
uidity transformation.
2.3.1 Derivatives Under ISDA Master Agreement
The type and use of collateral are governed in the CSA (credit support annex), which
represents an integral part of the ISDA Master Agreement framework1 and cannot be
considered separately. The ISDA Master Agreement forms the legal framework and
is applicable for the individual derivative contracts supplemented by the CSA. For
example, default netting in the Event of Default (default of a counterparty) is governed
by the ISDA Master Agreement including the netting of the collateral which in turn
is defined in the CSA. The CSA defines the type(s) of collateral and the terms of
margining/posting, while the transfer of the legal ownership is governed in the ISDA
Master Agreement. In general ISDA Master Agreements contracted under English
Law provide the legal transfer of ownership of the collateral while ISDA Master
1ISDA®, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., 2002 Master Agreement.
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Agreements contracted under New York Law do not. In the latter re-hypothecation,
i.e. the re-use of the received collateral for counterparties is prohibited.
In case of ISDA Master Agreements under English Law the derivative contracts
are terminated in case of an Event of Default and the collateral is taken into account
in order to determine the residual claim. The determination of the residual claim is
performed independently from the estate of the insolvent party.
2.3.2 Repos Under GMRA
A repo or repurchase agreement under GMRA2 can economically be seen as a collat-
eralized loan and is typically motivated by the request for cash. In case of repurchase
agreements, the legal title to the securities provided as collateral is transferred to the
counterparty (buyer) in exchange of the desired cash (purchase price). The credit risk
and liquidity of the underlying securities determine the haircut in the valuation of the
collateral. Adverse changes in the inherent credit risk of the securities are offset by an
increase in haircut and induce in terms of margining additional posting of collateral
to the counterparty. At maturity the securities are legally transferred back to original
owner (seller) in exchange for the agreed cash amount (repurchase price). In case of
a counterparty’s default the securities are not returned and the recovery risk of the
securities is borne by their legal owner (the buyer).
2.3.3 Securities Lending Under GSLMA
In contrast to a repo, a securities lending under GSLMA3 is motivated by the need for
securities but is (commonly) also a secured financing transaction since the securities
as well as the collateral are legally transferred to the respective counterparty. In the
secured case the collateral can be cash or other securities.
2.4 Credit and Counterparty Risk Related to Collateral
Consider the case that Bank 1 and Bank 2 enter into a repo transaction, where
Bank 2 receives cash from Bank 1 in return for securities. There are two features of
importance: Bank 1 needs cash funding, which requires an assumption with respect
to the sources of funding, e.g. central bank, deposits. The corresponding assumption
represents a component in determining the profitability of the repo. An additional
feature is the inherent wrong-way risk within the repo transaction. In this case the
2Sifma, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and ICMA, International Capital
Market Association, 2011 version Global Master Repurchase Agreement.
3ISLA, International Securities Lending Association, Global Master Securities Lending Agreement,
Version: January 2010.
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wrong-way risk for Bank 1 is defined as an adverse correlation (positive in the
example above) between counterparty credit risk toward Bank 2 and market value
of the collateral (securities). Assuming a long position in the underlying securities
(collateral) for Bank 1, the wrong-way risk constitutes a decrease in value of the
securities (collateral) and a simultaneous decrease in credit worthiness of Bank 2. In
this case the risk for Bank 1 is the failure of Bank 2 in balancing the collateral posting.
Since in a repo transaction the legal ownership is transferred to Bank 1, the net risk
position comprises the price risk (in the Event of Default of Bank 2) associated with
the collateral (securities) including the haircut and the cash claim (cash loan). A
similar rationale holds in case of a short position in securities (collateral) since an
event of default affects the ability to post as well as to return posted collateral. Similar
considerations hold in case of a (partially) collateralized OTC derivative transaction,
e.g. an interest rate swap.
3 Terms of Liquidity and Definition of Liquidity
Transformation
Dealing with the concept of liquidity reveals that the term is not defined consistently
or not uniformly in financial regulations. A natural way is to adopt legal definitions.
3.1 Terms of Liquidity
There is a variety of definitions for the term liquidity, e.g. meeting payment oblig-
ations (liquidity of an entity), liquid marketable securities (ability to buy and sell
financial instruments), etc. The analysis above reveals the interdependence of “liq-
uidity” and counterparty credit risk, respectively credit risk. As such liquidity of an
entity can be considered as the relatively measured ability for a bank to raise cash
from a credit line or in return of collateral which in turn is dependent on the liquid-
ity of financial instruments. The collateral itself is only accepted if the price of the
collateral can be reliably determined, e.g. it is traded with sufficient frequency on an
active market.
3.2 Comparison of Secured and Unsecured Financing
The best way to illustrate the concept formation of liquidity respectively liquidity
transformation is the comparison of unsecured and secured financing in case of a
default event. Continuing the example above, the following comparison considers
Bank 1 as cash provider.
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1. Financial action
Secured: Exchange of cash versus collateral
Unsecured: Paying out cash of a loan granted
2. Prerequisite and term of liquidity
Secured: “Liquid” collateral (price of collateral can be reliably determined)
Unsecured: Credit line loan illiquid - not marketable
3. Net (relative) risk position in case of default
Secured: Market value of collateral: Default Probability (issuer of the secu-
rity received as collateral) × recovery rate of collateral × amount
of collateral (proximate representation via haircut)
Unsecured: Recovery rate of cash loan × exposure at default (EAD)
4. Relation to estate of insolvent party
Secured: Only residual claim part of the estate of the insolvent party but
amount of residual claim is determined independently of the estate
of the insolvent party
Unsecured: Entirely part of the estate of the insolvent party
5. Risk
Secured: Credit risk of collateral issuer, correlation between counterparty
risk and price of collateral (wrong-way risk in an adverse case)
Unsecured: Credit risk with respect to the borrower
Note that in the comparison above the net (relative) risk position in both cases, for
secured and unsecured financing, involves a recovery rate but the associated risk
relates to different counterparties. In case of secured financing the default risk is
coupled with the recovery risk (price risk) of the collateral and the risk position can
be settled promptly in case of a default while in case of the unsecured financing the
settlement of the recovery depends on the insolvency process.
This comparison in particular shows that the credit risk toward the counterparty
in the unsecured financing transaction being rather illiquid is opposed to the market
value risk of the received collateral which is assumed to be liquid in the secured case
plus the correlation of this risk and the credit risk of the issuer of the securities taken
as collateral. In the adverse case this risk correlation is also known as “wrong way
risk”.
3.3 Liquidity Transformation
Accordingly considering liquidity as an absolute quantity is not useful but as a relative
quantity: a relation between secured financing and unsecured financing, which we
term liquidity transformation. This transformation is not independent from credit
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respective counterparty risk, since each type of financing is associated with a different
type of credit risk. The liquidity transformation is dependent on the type of entity
and cannot be considered separately from its legal status. A bank has different access
and a higher degree of freedom to assign liquidity irrespective of the purpose than,
e.g. an investment fund.
4 New Approach to CVA Hedging
The new CVA hedging approach outlined below represents a response to current
challenges in banking regulation and reveals the importance of liquidity transfor-
mation. The legal-based background described above can be used to explain current
challenges of banking industry if in addition to prevailing market conditions the
regulatory and financial accounting environments are taken into account. Recent
environmental changes have immediate impact on banking business activities con-
cerning counterparty risk and can be summarized as follows:
Regulatory and Accounting Aspects
• CCR (counterparty credit risk) is
under scrutiny of regulators and
financial accounting standard set-
ters.
• Increased regulatory require-
ments on bilateral collateraliza-
tion and clearing.
• Increased (regulatory) capital
requirements for banks.
• Increased P/L volatility due to
IFRS fair value accounting rules
(e.g. recognition of CVA).
Business Impact
• Increased (regulatory) capital
affects resp. limits banking busi-
ness.
• Intensified application of credit risk
mitigation by netting, collateraliza-
tion and hedging.
• Increased demand for secured (col-
lateralized) transactions
• Increased demand for (liquid / high
quality) collateral.
• Increased demand for optimization
of collateral.
4.1 Issue
During the financial crises regulators and financial accounting setters notified the
relevance of counterparty credit risk in OTC derivative contracts. In response to this
relevance several regulatory (legislative) initiatives have been undertaken like central
clearing, increased regulatory capital, etc. These impacted the business of banking
industry in several ways: intensified use of credit risk mitigation techniques and
increased demand for secured transactions (demand for collateral, cf. also [3]).
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Despite the environmental changes credit risk mitigation is and remains essential
to continue banking business. Considering equity as a scarce source, banks are forced
to tighten their credit exposure in order to offset the increase in capital charges due to
increased costs for CCR and other factors. The tightening of credit exposure limits
banking business and increases the demand for credit risk mitigation techniques
(including hedging).
The mentioned regulatory changes induce tremendous costs for the banking indus-
try. Therefore, managing credit risk by commonly used CDS hedging strategies
becomes expensive in presence of the banking regulation, so credit risk manage-
ment will be rearranged, e.g. more offsetting positions, avoiding exposures (reduc-
ing limits) or transferred (“outsourced”) outside the regulated banking sector, so e.g.
investment funds are in a favorable position to manage a bank’s risks. This also holds
for counterparty credit risk following the idea to transfer counterparty credit risk to
market participants outside the banking sector that are in the situation to manage this
risk economically at lower cost than banks.
Additionally banking industry is faced with various different regulations. With
respect to counterparty credit risk a bank is confronted with conflicting objectives
resulting from regulatory requirements, i.e. Basel II/III, and financial accounting
rules. Therefore, under current regulatory and accounting requirements banks can-
not manage counterparty credit risk (CCR) of derivatives uniformly in respect of
capital requirements and P/L volatility. This results from the fact that the hedging
of counterparty credit risk exposure (in terms of Basel II/III requirements) requires
the hedging of current and future changes of exposure, while IFRS only considers
current exposure. So a bank is required to hedge more than the current exposure
(“overhedging”) in terms of Basel II/III. But since hedging is mainly carried out by
derivatives as CDS, these CDS cause P/L volatility under IFRS, since derivatives are
recognized at fair value through P/L.
As described above secured and unsecured financing is common practice in
finance industry and can be observed in counterparty credit risk of OTC derivative
contracts. As illustrated below in an uncollateralized OTC derivative trade between
Bank A and counterparty B, the parties enter into an unsecured financing relation-
ship. If the market value of the derivative trades of Bank A against counterparty
B increases then Bank A is exposed to counterparty credit risk (CVA risk). Bank A
implicitly provides counterparty B an illiquid credit line in the sense, that the positive
exposure amount (“market value”) is recognized as an asset which becomes a legal
claim in the Event of Default. This exposure is not a tradable asset but needs to be
funded thus it could be interpreted as an illiquid asset. In comparison to standard
banking credit business, this credit line is unlimited and varies with the market value
of the underlying derivative trades, which implies also unlimited funding. The cur-
rent focus of discussions and research concentrates on measuring counterparty credit
risk by exposure and default probability modeling (CVA risk) and the assignment of
the appropriate discount rate for the OTC derivative trades reflecting the FVA. The
discussed approaches share the following assumptions:
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1. No market segmentation between collateralized and uncollateralized OTC deriv-
ative trades.
2. The application of the absence of arbitrage principle, which in particular assumes
the unlimited use of liquidity by market participants.
3. Liquidity risk and credit risk cannot be decoupled.
4. The coincidence of counterparty credit risk and credit risk, which can be both
hedged by the same type of hedging instruments (credit default swaps (CDS),
contingent credit default swaps (CCDS)).
5. The absence of transaction costs, which are represented by regulatory costs (e.g.
CVA risk charges according to Basel II/III) and reported earnings volatility under
IFRS stemming from fair value accounting of counterparty fair value adjustments
and derivative valuation.
These ideal assumptions are not necessarily met in reality, therefore alternative
approaches have to be explored.
4.2 Solution
Since banks with significant activities in derivatives markets can be affected quite
heavily by the aforementioned issues, a workable solution should solve the build-in
conflict of regulatory and accounting requirements. As a result, the solution con-
tributes to an improved competitiveness of the bank in the context of derivative risk
management, derivatives’ pricing, and support the bank in conducting derivatives
business which will ultimately benefit the economy as a whole. Consequently, a
potential solution is about developing a financial instrument (“credit risk mitigating
instrument”) which reduces the Basel II/III CCR capital requirements and CVA risk
charge without resulting in additional P/L volatility under IFRS. Such a financial
instrument represents a solution to the issues described above since it creates:
• A market for counterparty credit risk exposure
The positive exposure of an (un-) collateralized derivative portfolio can be con-
sidered as an illiquid asset in contrast, e.g. to a liquid issuance of a bank.
• A new asset type—make the derivative claim a tradable asset
The idea is to make this exposure tradable in exchange for collateral by means of
an instrument like Collateral Support Annex (CSA) which directly refers to the
possibly varying positive exposure of a derivative portfolio.
• An active market involving banks and investment funds
In order to increase liquidity and to avoid only a shift of capital charges from one
institution to another due to hedging activities for the taken credit risk a transfer
to a market participant outside the banking sector is considered.
The outline of a solution follows the liquidity transformation. The unsecured financ-
ing for OTC derivatives would be represented by uncollateralized OTC derivatives
while secured financing requires corresponding posting of collateral. Pursuing the
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Fig. 1 Secured OTC derivative transaction
aim of decoupling liquidity and counterparty risk, at least three parties are necessary
to involve as demonstrated in the analysis on repos above. Therefore, the aim could
not be achieved by cash collateralized bilateral OTC derivatives commonly used in
the interbank market, since there is still a one-to-one correspondence between liquid-
ity requirements (e.g. cash collateral postings) and counterparty risk. Additionally
a bilateral CSA assumes that both counterparties have unlimited access to liquidity,
which represents a difficulty if counterparty B is a corporate according to its limited
access to collateral/cash. Therefore a secured financing transaction for CVA hedging
has to be structured differently.
The secured financing transaction outlined in Fig. 1 involves a third party “Default
Risk Taker” C, who is posting collateral to Bank A on behalf of counterparty B, i.e.
whenever the value of the derivative trade is positive for Bank A. This transaction
represents a tri-party CSA and works similar to a margining. The transaction between
“Default Risk Taker” C and Bank A is an asymmetric contract, since if the value of
the derivative trade is negative for Bank A, no collateral is provided to or by Bank A.
In case of a default of counterparty B the posted collateral is not returned to “Default
Risk Taker C”. The structure described above represents the appropriate complement
for a bilateral uncollateralized OTC derivative transaction.
The structure reveals the concept of liquidity transformation including a decou-
pling of liquidity and counterparty risk, since by using the contract the unsecured
financing transaction is transformed into a secured financing transaction. Referring
to the comparison of unsecured and secured financing described above (cf. Sect. 2.3),
the proposed structure goes one step further by linking both market segments and
transforming liquidity within one single transaction. By definition of the liquidity
transformation, the transaction exchanges different types of credit risk.
4.3 Application
The table in Fig. 2 shows the contemplation of the new CVA hedge structure (cash
collateral with contingent financial guarantee, “CCCFG”; for more detail refer to
[5]) to existing credit risk mitigation techniques applied in the banking industry. Its
main features are summarized as follows:
• The proposed structure represents a credit risk mitigating instrument, which
reduces the Basel II/III CCR capital requirements CVA risk charge, since the cash
collateral provided by a third party is permitted under Basel II/III requirements
and reduces the exposure according to Basel II/III.
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Fig. 2 Current and new approaches for credit risk mitigation in banking industry
• Accordingly there is immediate regulatory capital relief, which results in an imme-
diate saving respectively reduction of the cost of equity.
• The proposed structure simultaneously qualifies as a contingent financial guarantee
such that there is no additional P/L volatility under IFRS. In particular the financial
guarantee accounting under IFRS applies to the proposed structure by considering
the case of default. In case of a default of OTC derivatives contracted under ISDA
the final claim is determined. The financial guarantee under IFRS comes into effect
only at default—not before—and “guarantees” the value of the final claim, which
is recognized at amortized cost and physically transferred to counterparty C in
return for cash to Bank A. The final claim takes into account the posted collateral
until the Event of Default. For a more detailed description refer to [5].
• As becomes apparent from the table above the new CVA hedge structure is a sepa-
rate financial instrument. This cash collateral with contingent financial guarantee
(“CCCFG”) differs from a “traditional” CDS/CCDS, since the collateral postings
are directly related to the counterpartys exposure. In case of a CCDS the cash col-
lateral refers to the CCDS contract itself reflecting its value and there is no direct
legal link to the exposure subject to hedging by the CCDS. Additionally CCDS
represents derivatives in terms of IFRS and not necessarily qualify as credit risk
mitigation instrument under Basel II/III. If a CCDS qualifies as credit risk mitiga-
tion instrument it applies to the Basel II/III PD, while the CCCFG directly affects
the exposure.
• Operationally the new CVA hedging instrument is more effective and less costly
than CDS delta hedging approaches, since a constant adjustment of a hedging
position using CDS induces transaction costs and depends also on the gamma of
the risk position. Accordingly the hedge position is never “perfect”.
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• The approach is flexible with respect to counterparty risk profiles, since it applies
to linear and nonlinear exposure profiles.
• The legal framework of the approach is based on ISDA, which ensures the oper-
ational effectiveness in terms of legal certainty and the recognition in front office
IT systems in order to process the transaction.
• It has to be noticed that investment funds have to observe certain rules and reg-
ulations which come with the specific fund format and domicile. For example,
funds fulfilling the highest standards are limited to invest in eligible assets which
are characterized by sufficient liquidity in order to ensure that the fund is in a
position to meet potential redemptions. Bilateral transactions that are illiquid by
definition require a buy-and-hold investment strategy which may not be suitable
for all investment funds.
4.4 Example
In the following for the sake of simplicity only a qualitative example is provided, since
by comparing the induced costs the CVA hedge already indicates its profitability.
• Bank A holds a portfolio of uncollateralized derivatives (e.g. interest rate swaps
(IRS)) with Counterparty B (e.g. a corporate) a netting set is considered.4
• Bank A enters into a CVA hedge transaction with Investment Fund C who is
taking over credit (counterparty credit risk of B) and market risk and provides
liquidity with reference to the uncollateralized derivative transaction(s) between
Bank A and Counterparty B in terms of the cash collateral postings to Bank A. The
transaction between Investment Fund C and Bank A is a unilateral (asymmetric)
collateral contract in favour of Bank A (and on behalf of Counterparty B). The
transaction chart follows Fig. 1.
• In the following table the impact for Bank A with and without CVA hedge is
summarized:
With respect to the risk illustrated in the first line in the table above, the CVA
hedge transaction mitigates entirely the risk of Bank A by transferring the risk to
investment fund C. This results from the posted cash collateral of Investment Fund
C to Bank A on behalf of counterparty C. Comparing the induced costs (second line
in the table above) reveals that the (uncollateralized) derivative business is exposed
to regulatory and cost of equity charges as well as funding costs. In case of the CVA
hedge transaction all these costs are inapplicable, since the posted cash collateral by
Investment Fund C to Bank A on behalf of counterparty B leads to entire regulatory
capital and cost of capital relief and serves as funding to the derivative exposure
between Bank A and counterparty B. On the other hand Bank A pays a fee to
Investment Fund C for taking over the counterparty credit risk of B and also interest
4In order to keep legal and operational complexity in an event of default low one netting set is
considered.
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Fig. 3 Comparison derivatives exposure with and without CVA Hedge transaction from bank A’s
perspective
on the posted cash collateral. Describing the associated cash flow profiles the two
situations, default and non-default of the counterparty, are distinguished (third line
in the table above). While in case without CVA hedge structure the cash profiles are
straightforward, with CVA hedge transaction in addition fee and interest payments
on the collateral have to be considered in the non-default situation. In the event of
default of counterparty B, the residual claim of the transaction is physically delivered
to Investment Fund C in return for cash equal to the notional of the residual claim.
This procedure follows standard ISDA rules (Fig. 3).
5 Conclusion
The new CVA hedging instrument is used in order to transfer counterparty credit
risk to entities which are able to manage the risk on an economic basis at lower
cost. Investment funds can act as “credit risk taker” and manage counterparty credit
exposure at a lower cost than banks, since investment funds are not subject to regu-
latory capital requirements according to Basel II/III. It has to be noted though that
an implementation of the solution described above requires an intense capability and
knowledge of dealing with derivatives at the risk taking investment funds. On the
other hand, since investment funds are not subject to the same regulations as those for
banks described above they may become a natural partner for banks in this context.
The proposed structure bridges the difference between capital rules and financial
accounting standards in order to optimize capital requirements and charges for CVA.
This is achieved by its liquidity transformation property—the liquidity and credit risk
transformation of the counterparty’s exposure—and by meeting the Basel II/III and
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IFRS requirements: simultaneous CCR capital and CVA risk charge relief as well as
reduced P/L volatility in IFRS resulting from CVA accounting. While the objective
outlined herein is predominantly to provide a suitable solution for CVA issues in
context of derivatives transactions, it may also create interesting opportunities for
investors of the risk taking investment funds.
This solution also contributes to valuation and the discussion on FVA and CVA,
since it requires the pricing of the collateral between counterparties “at arm’s length”.
This price determines the discount rate by applying the absence of arbitrage principle.
As a consequence FVA is disentangled from CVA by using the proposed structure
as a mean.
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